Материал: disser_arhipov

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«Generally speaking, in an ideal world, GSM (generalized symbolic media – V.A.) would circulate alongside each other with little tension: Priests are paid a salary, and thus money in the form of wages would circulate alongside sacredness/piety, but would maintain a reasonable and safe distance. Religion, in other words, would never acquire the logic of economics».478

However, the author emphasizes that it is not always the case in real life. First, «where two GSM with the same mode of orientation circulate beside each other, and the foreign GSM dominates the indigenous GSM, we can talk of corruption».479 A clear example of corruption can be seen in a case where in law or politics such GSM as money is used instead of political power or justice correspondingly. Second, when different modalities of orientation are confused and the instrumental one starts to dominate over the moral one, we can raise a question of “pollution”:

«Money, or ERVs [external referents of value] connected to it, like toys, can be advertised to working mothers as a solution to the time crunch preventing them from giving love and loyalty to their children in the prescribed normative way. Love, in this situation, becomes a servant of money, as the cultural and material components of the latter compete or supplant the former in real social relationships».480

Thus, the methodology that follows from the concept of generalized symbolic intermediaries allows us to identify those subjects of social relationships which can be significant in the legal sense. In other words, as it follows from the general context of this study, the common sense in determining the range of possible objects of legal regulation is expressed in the convertible socio-currency value of these objects. This approach, which reflects the methodological search sequence expressed in the present study, answers the question of what can in principle be included in the field of the legal or, in more dogmatic terms, constitute a subject of legal regulation.

478Abrutyn S. Money, Love, and Sacredness: Generalised Symbolic Media and the Production of Instrumental, Affectual, and Moral Reality // Czech Sociological Review. – 2015. – Vol. 51. – No. 3. – P. 460.

479Ibid. P. 461.

480Ibid.

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§ 4. The criterion of functional adequacy or “fantasy nature” of object of social relationships

As it follows from all of the previously mentioned discussions, the criterion of “seriousness” of object of social relationships is persuasively relevant to the cases when we need to determine whether or not it is possible to extend legal regulation to some, and first of all “new”, objects of social relationships (an example of which, as we will see later, may be, for instance, smart robots, tradeable big data and other phenomena of digital economy as reflected in a number of publications of the author of this research). However, in cases of “borderline situations” of legal interpretation, or in other words – “areas of penumbra”, where certain legal rules that are potentially applicable or not applicable to new social relationships exist, the problem of the following nature arises. If we take as the sole criterion the criterion of seriousness, we will not have a clear way to discern to which of the current legal norms such a “serious” subject corresponds. If, however, we will try to employ an alternative criterion of correspondence between our object of interest and its description in hypothesis or disposition of legal norm as the sole criterion, we will not reach clarity on the matter of whether or not we shall extend the norm in question to such a new object. In other words, the “criterion of seriousness” makes it possible to determine the significance of the object of legal regulation, but does not provide an opportunity to establish and explain a semantic connection with a particular concept used in the legal text.

The previously mentioned problem was formulated already in application to the example of blocking of website containing imaginary (game-related) recipe of “dynamite” in Minecraft computer game based on the norms that do not contain specific criteria of assessment. The flow of discussion was as follows. Let us assume that the main criteria for solving of the collision lies in the fact that such a “recipe” is not related to any social institution in social constructivist sense at all (such an approach was reflected in the initial hypothesis). Even if we explicate this initial view to a degree of specification that

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presupposes assessment of convertible “social currency value”, we may find some contradictions. Yes, the “recipe” of such dynamite itself cannot be used to create a real explosive substance, but the game that, at the same time, is played by millions of people worldwide, cannot avoid having at least some convertible social value at least in some aspect. Moreover, many players create and maintain social institutions connected exclusively to creating objects in virtual world (i.e. there are social institutions). Looks like a deadlock. Let us try to approach the problem from the other side. Assume that the case is solely related to the fact that the recipe of dynamite is not real (running ahead of the story, we can say that the recipe is “fantasy” or missing functional adequacy). Let us then try to build up argumentation from the contrary. If the recipe of dynamite were real, would it clearly say that the website should be blocked? It has to be emphasized that the case implies absence of direct legislative criteria for blocking of such kind of information, in contrast to, for example, certain situations related to illegal drugs. But something seems wrong here is well – if we consider this case as an illustration of a broad case of potentially illegal and/or publicly dangerous information, the necessity of blocking is not apparent – for instance, we can decide that such information for certain reasons should be permitted. After this twist of the discussion the issue in general transforms into the issue of whether or not it is possible to limit dissemination of artistic (non-serious, playful, imitating – i.e. a simulacrum of its kind) information that contains references to real objects, or it would contradict to the principle of freedom of creativity? If the question is formulated in this way, it becomes clear that in “borderline situations” of legal interpretation, there should actually be several criteria that shall be applied simultaneously. It is because of this that we now would like to develop the second criterion of functional adequacy. In its turn, we see the concept of “fantasy nature” as the opposite one to the functional adequacy, which is used in law mostly in narrow sense related to the quality of innovation in application to trademarks.

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What is “fantasy nature”? To being with, let us try to go from the contrary. Thus, for instance, the N.N. Menshikova, the author of the article “The Category of Fantasy Nature in Science” admits that fantasy nature is “one of the mental categories of those who participate in cognition of both real and imaginary worlds”.481 As N.N. Menshikova says, the category of fantasy nature may be interpreted in broad and in narrow sense. In broad sense, fantasy nature “reflects the ability of language and thought to discern essential qualities of real world by means of referring to internal subjective individual world of a human being”.482

In a narrow sense, fantasy nature “is associated with artistic fiction, with literary genres, as well as with styles in painting and architecture (the concept of “fantastic” architecture by P. Florensky)”.483 As the main approach for consideration, the author chooses a broad interpretation of fantasy nature. However, this approach does not clarify the meaning of the term “fantasy nature” in the context of the present study, since it actually implies the identification of the terms “of fantasy nature” and “imaginary”, and we would prefer to use different terms to designate: imaginary,484 again, in a broad sense, refers to the properties of consciousness, including, in particular, the reconstruction of an object in consciousness, and such a reconstruction will not necessarily be fantasy. Quite typical, in this sense, is P. Ricoeur’s quotation, which N.N. Menshikova provides:

«To imagine is not to have a mental image of something, but to reveal connections by means of imaging».485

481 Menshikova N.N. Category of Fantasy in Science // Proceedings of Chelyabinsk State University. 2008. No. 36.

P. 95.

482Ibid.

483Ibid.

484In the context of this study, the “imaginary” is a virtual model of a real-world object.

485Ibid. P. 99.

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Again, we note that here we are talking more about clarifying conventional terms in the context of the present study, and not trying to identify some “objective” meaning of terms that probably not even exists. I.e. we talk here about application of the method of analytical philosophy.

In search of the solution for the problem posed, let us assume that the description of the criterion of functional adequacy or fantasy nature of functionality of the object of social relationships through an interpretation of the concept of correspondent truth in logic, referring to isomorphism, has certain prospects.486 In this context, it is a distinction between the two interpretations of the correspondent theory of truth proposed by D. Marian in the source cited in the preceding footnote: “correspondence as correlation” and “correspondence as isomorphism”.487 A stricter option (correlation) implies that “every truth correspond to exactly one fact”, while “different truths correspond to different facts”.488 A softer option implies that “truthbearers and facts are both complex structured entities: truthbearers are composed of (other truthbearers and ultimately of) words, or concepts; facts are composed of (other facts or states of affairs and ultimately of) things, properties, and relations”.489 Hence, the correspondence is determined by the relation between the parts of truthbearers, on the one hand, and facts, on the other.

In turn, according to E.V. Bakeeva,

«...everything changes at that moment when this invariant itself (along with its ontological assumptions) becomes questioned. This problematicity deprives all the concepts of truth, formulated within the framework of a gnoseologic orientation, from being convincing at once. The first and foremost of them, the correspondent, reveals its doubtfulness only insofar as it loses the stability of the concept of reality. The virtualization process of reality, which began

486When applying this theory, a set of ideas and interpretations is implied, which do not significantly go beyond the common places of the science of logic, as, for example, they are described in the following exhaustive generalization: Marian D. The Correspondence Theory of Truth [Electronic resource] // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. – [Site]. – URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#6 (accessed: 03.10.2018).

487Ibid.

488Ibid.

489Ibid.