Материал: disser_arhipov

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S. Abrutyn stresses that the concept of generalized symbolic media has not only remained relevant, but also has significant methodological potential. Although this concept was popularized by T. Parsons and N. Luhmann, and later by J. Habermas,444 its origins can be seen in the “Capital” of K. Marx and in the economic sociology of M. Weber, and, in addition, in the phenomenology of G. Simmel.445 The author stresses the similarity of the concept to P. Bourdie’s theory of economic capital, but notes that all types of social exchange in the application of the French scientist’s approach can be reduced to economic exchange, although history shows that this is not the case. Т. Parsons also exaggerated the importance of economics to the concept of generalized symbolic media, but it should be borne in mind that in different times and places, individual intermediaries were more valuable and better integrated than money. Limiting of the media to money can distort the picture, as it is only a view of capitalist society.446

The course of reasoning of S. Abrutyn is as follows. Т. Parsons and N. Smelser borrowed the concept of generalized symbolic media from the German economic and philosophical school. Initially, the term was used to describe the exchange between the economic and political systems (i.e. the process of converting power and money). Studying power, T. Parsons came to the conclusion that two more media were needed to reconcile the approach with his vision of the four subsystems of the social system. These new media were influence and value commitments. The qualities of all media other than money were modeled on the basis of the quality of money, as the latter are an ideal example of a generalized symbolic media. As T. Parsons believed, in order for something to be considered a generalized symbolic media, it must have: (1) value, i.e., to be a symbolic embodiment of the objects meant, (2) interest, i.e., a close and clear connection with such

444The views of T. Parsons, N. Luhmann and J. Habermas, albeit without explicit application of the concept of generalized symbolic media and (or) their analogues to the object of legal relationship, as proposed in this study, have had a significant impact on the modern philosophy of law in Russia, see for example: Grafsky V.G. Legal Communication and Legal Communion // Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 2013. № 4. – P. 25–36

445Ibid. P. 446.

446Ibid. P. 446–447.

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an object, (3) means to determine which objects have value, and (4) a normative scheme of rules. Т. Parsons, however, may seem inconsistent because in one place he referred to generalized symbolic media as a currency and in another as a language. In turn, by criticizing T. Parsons, N. Luhmann rejected the idea that influence and value commitments are independent media, as they are already implied in the case of all other media. He also saw media not as objects of exchange, but as modes of communication, adding to the power and money the truth for science and love for kinship relations. However, N. Luhmann’s views can also be criticized. Specifically, since the number of media does not necessarily have to be reduced to four or two initial ones (S. Abrutyn notes that it would be unnatural to correlate well-known media with the religious system – it has its own kind of media). In general, although T. Parson’s approach was focused on economy in one-sided manner, it was also wrong to reduce the generalized symbolic media to communication as such instead. S. Abrutyn also notes that perceptions of generalized symbolic media were subsequently developed by J. Habermas, J. Coleman, D. Baldwin, T. Turner, L. Vanderberg and S. Abrutyn himself.447

It is important that S. Abrutyn accepts the concept of T. Parsons, but makes a reservation that brings his interpretation of the concept of generalized symbolic media closer to the discourse of the semantic limits of law. Т. Parsons assumed that the exchange takes place between systems, while S. Abrutyn stresses that the exchange, mediated by generalized symbolic media, takes place between individuals and groups – “GSM [Generalized Symbolic Media] must be seen as extant in real relationships and groups”.448 As a consequence, such media are no less relevant for the micro-level of research than for the macro-level.449 In other words, it would also be useful to study the exchange between real people in terms of the exchange of generalized symbolic media. Finally, S. Abrutyn

447Ibid. PP. 448–449.

448Ibid. P. 450.

449Ibid.

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suggests that generalized symbolic media could in itself be a goal and thus be seen not only as a means of facilitating communication, but also as a resource – symbolic and material. It should be noted that in our study this view, albeit implicitly, was implied in the previous paragraphs, but S. Abrutyn stresses that this aspect of the generalized symbolic media was not developed by either N. Luhmann, J. Habermas or T. Parsons himself. This idea has an interesting branch that the author points out: each of the generalized symbolic media has a cultural context and connotations that draw a picture of the “ideal pursuer”. For example, in the case of priesthood, it is an ascetic, and in the case of love, it is a romantic. In the light of all of the above, it is obvious that generalized symbolic media can be accumulated and act as a means of exchange.450

S. Abrutyn defines generalized symbolic media as

«…intra-institutional clusters of symbolic and material resources that act as mechanisms by which institutional culture can be acquired, used, developed, and transmitted».451

However, S. Abrutyn himself continues the economic metaphor, perhaps unconsciously – he notes that every institutional group has an elite of

«…institutional entrepreneurial class” who received certain [symbolic] independence from other elites.452 Generalized symbolic media «organise talk and cognition; they are exchanged as Parsons presumed; they are not just placeholders of value, but valued things in themselves, and thus resources to be pursued; and, as such, they work to formulate worldviews and ideologies that make economy different from polity different from religion both mentally, but also in physical, temporal, and social space».453

It is also important for us how S. Abrutyn justifies that money is not the only or the main generalized symbolic media. The author stresses that the problem of media should be

450Ibid. P. 451.

451Ibid.

452It's financial at the same time if you take the money or convert into money.

453Ibid. PP. 451–452.

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viewed from the point of view of creating and maintaining social order in complex societies. He notes the view of M. Weber, according to which money has become an instrument legitimizing indirect exchange (as opposed to barter), and G. Simmel, who believed that money literally shortened the distance between people, because it was a variable for “standardized, formalized and separable value”, thus becoming a force for cultural integration.454 At the same time, as S. Abrutyn points out, historical and cultural studies show that the “market” in the ancient states of Mesopotamia, Egypt and, for example, China consisted not of money, but of power. In addition, in some cases, in which money was used, it was only the appearance – in fact, it was about loyalty, which S. Abrutyn considers as an independent generalized symbolic media. What is equally important, from a historical point of view, loyalty, thus, no less important than money.455 The author then demonstrates very convincingly how the formation of power as a generalized symbolic media, as well as sacredness in the same quality, took place, using historical material.456 These components of S. Abrutyn’s argument are important for us to demonstrate that money is not the main, but one of the many generalized symbolic intermediaries. In light of this, it becomes clearer which of the relations can potentially be regulated by their “sociocurrency value” and which cannot.

In S. Abrutyn’s system, there are not four, but ten generalized symbolic media that correspond to ten institutional domains, rather than four subsystems of the social system, and it follows from the author’s views that this list is not necessarily exhaustive:

1) The institutional field of kinship corresponds to such media as love and loyalty. They constitute the language and external objects associated with the creation and designation of obligations to others.

454Ibid. P. 452.

455Ibid.

456Ibid.

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2)The institutional field of economics obviously corresponds to such a media as money, which according to S. Abrutyn is the language and external objects associated with the production and distribution of goods and services.

3)The institutional field of polity, with the same degree of clarity, corresponds to such a media as power, which makes up the language and external objects related to the control of actions and relations of others and subordination to the superior.

4)The institutional field of law is corresponded by such media as justice and dispute resolution, which constitute the language and external objects related to the resolution of disputes arising from public legal relations and appealing to the norms of fairness and morality.457

5)The institutional field of religion is corresponded by such media as sacredness and piety, which make up the language and external objects related to actions, exchanges and communications with the unobserved supernatural field.458

6)The institutional field of education corresponds to such media as learning, (or “knowledge”, depending on the context) which is a language and external objects related to the acquisition and transfer of material and cultural knowledge.

7)The institutional field of science is corresponded by such media as applied knowledge and truth, which make up the language and external objects related to actions, exchanges and communication based on the standards of acquisition and use of proven knowledge about all dimensions of social, biological and psycho-chemical universes.

457This interpretation, at first glance, may potentially conflict with the idea of the concept of semantic limits of law, according to which the reference to moral values refers not to the field of pure absurdity, but to the intermediate field of “weighing” [moral] values. But such a conflict is only visible – the application of the concept of generalized symbolic intermediaries for the qualification of “social and currency value” of the subject of legal relations is carried out in a different sense. Moral value or moral significance in this case refers not to the argumentation, but to the direct subject of the legal relationship.

458Despite some vagueness in this formulation, from the point of view of both theoretical and empirical sociology, it is not what is (or what is not) really important here, but how it is reconstructed as part of the institution of subjectively objective social reality.