Материал: disser_arhipov

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§ 3.3. Assessment of the ideas of absurdity through the prism of the concepts of common sense

There are quite a few examples and attempts to place the ideas of absurdity in a certain context. However, we do not see any strict definitions yet. Maybe we should go from the opposite side? Absurdity is usually contrasted to common sense. Perhaps the situation will be clarified by addressing the appropriate philosophical school? Indeed, in a sense, the main purpose of this work is to reflect on and theoretically structure the application of common sense in legal reasoning. The concept of common sense cannot be understood in isolation from its own, according to the working assumption, antonym – absurdity. What is common sense and how it is viewed in contemporary social and humanitarian literature?

The representative of philosophical sciences A.A. Ivin in his textbook “Fundamentals of the Theory of Argumentation” roughly characterizes common sense as “common, inherent to every person sense of truth and justice, acquired with experience”343 and analyzes the use of this concept in the history of approaches to argumentation, including Aristotle,344 Thomas Aquinas345 and later thinkers. From these observations, one can note the characteristic of the views of A. Sheftsbury, who

343Ivin A.A. Fundamentals of the Argumentation Theory: Textbook / A.A. Ivin. – 2nd Edition – M.: Berlin DirectMedia, 2015. PP. 185–186.

344“The appeal to common sense was highly valued in antiquity and went hand in hand with the opposition of wisdom (Sofia) and practical knowledge (Fronesis). This opposition was theoretically developed by Aristotle and developed by his followers to the level of a vital ideal. Practical knowledge guiding human actions is a special, independent type of knowledge. Practical knowledge is aimed at a concrete situation and requires taking into account “circumstances” in their infinite variety. Life is not built on theoretical principles and general principles, it is specific and guided by specific knowledge, assessed from the point of view of common sense”. See: Ivin A.A. Fundamentals of the Argumentation Theory: Textbook / A.A. Ivin. – 2nd Edition – M.: Berlin Direct-Media, 2015. – P. 186.

345“In similarity, Thomas Aquinas, for example, common sense is the common basis of external sentiment and the ability to judge a given, common to all people”. See: Ivin A.A. Fundamentals of the Argumentation Theory: Textbook / A.A. Ivin. – 2nd Edition – M.: Berlin Direct-Media, 2015. – P. 186.

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«...interpreted common sense as an understanding of the common good and, at the same time, as a commitment to the community or society, as natural feelings, humanity and courtesy. Common sense is more of a virtue of the heart than of the mind, which is not just a common virtue, but implies a certain moral and even metaphysical basis».346

In general, it is clear that “common sense” is also a very vague concept, which is likely to be understood only with the help of, apparently, common sense itself. However, we note that in the view given, common sense is linked to “commitment to the community or society” and refers to a moral basis. It is difficult to refrain from a possible addition in the first part – “with [semantic] commitment to the community or society”. The author also mentions the philosophy of the Scottish school and his quote from H.-G. Gadamer in this regard, according to which

«...the concept of common sense concentrates on society: “It serves to guide us in public affairs or public life, when our capacity for reasoning leaves us in the dark”» (emphasis added – V.A.).347

«The philosophy of a healthy human mind in the Scottish school is not only a healing tool against the “sleepwalking” of metaphysics, it also contains the fundamentals of a moral philosophy that truly satisfies the vital needs of society».348 In view of the above quotation, it is difficult to refrain from drawing an analogy according to which common sense paradoxically turns out to be an “unconscious” (in the Jungian sense) of law. It is worth mentioning that moral motives are important in the concept of common sense within the framework of A. Bergson’s ideas, according to which

«...although common sense is related to feelings, it’s a social construct. Feelings put us in some relation to things, common sense guides our relations with people. He is not so much a

346Ivin A.A. Fundamentals of the Argumentation Theory: Textbook / A.A. Ivin. – 2nd Edition – M.: Berlin DirectMedia, 2015. – P. 187.

347Ibid.

348Ibid.

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gift as a constant correction of eternally new situations, work on adaptation to the reality of general principles».349

The conclusion of A.A. Ivin regarding the modern meaning of common sense is also important for us:

«Essential importance is attached to common sense by modern philosophical hermeneutics, which opposes its intellectualization and bringing it to the level of a simple correction: what contradicts common sense in feelings, judgments and conclusions cannot be correct

(emphasis added – V.A.)».350

However, it is this presumption that underlies most of the sources studied, which present the empirical examples of legal reasoning relevant to the research topic.

To conclude the discussion on the common sense concept of A.A. Ivin in this source, it should be noted that it is not sufficiently disclosed for the purposes of this study, although it was quite useful to consider the above judgments. The author notes that

«... common sense is applicable first of all in public, practical matters. It is used to judge not on the basis of general prescriptions of reason, but rather on convincing examples. Therefore, the history and experience of life are crucial for him. Common sense cannot be learned, it can only be practiced. It has a dual, descriptive and evaluative character: on the one hand, it builds on past events and on the other hand, it is a sketch, a project of the future».351

It should be noted that other notions of common sense are also rather vague. They clearly do not allow to build a rational legal reasoning (and legal reasoning cannot be anything but rational), but in some cases, how easy and natural is the conclusion about the lack of common sense or absurdity of any interpretation or action because it does not make sense.

349Ibid.

350Ibid. – PP. 187–188.

351Ibid. – P. 188.

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It is also interesting to address some of the domestic studies, especially since there is little written about common sense as such. Thus, a prominent pre-Revolution follower of the Scottish school of common sense philosophy, Isidor Savvich Prodan, wrote:

«Practitioners do not ask themselves questions about knowledge: what is truth and how it is achieved. Acting according to their innate cognitive instinct, they make fewer mistakes in their activities than other philosophers in their works. Moreover, people of science and practice, who are not familiar with the philosophy of knowledge, make important scientific discoveries; the application of these discoveries sometimes changes the entire social order of life: hence, these discoveries are not misleading. They undoubtedly confirm the correctness of knowledge and thinking among the people who made these discoveries. Particularly brilliant advances have been made by the human mind in the last century in the field of science and technology».352

The author goes on to give examples of how humans have subjugated natural forces and placed them at the service of progress. The author’s further reasoning (and probably demonstration of sanity, at least at first glance) appears quite straightforward:

«In contrast to these rapid advances in natural science and technology, philosophers of the past century often went against common sense and argued about what was causing a smile in people who were strangers to philosophical wisdom. Who is right, philosophers or common sense people? Without answering this question, we will repeat and prove Reed’s idea that philosophy was born much later than the common sense of humanity: people in general reasoned correctly well before the emergence of philosophy. So, for example, mankind thought logically for a millennium before the brilliant Aristotle managed to write the first logic. And now hundreds of millions of people reason logically, not even knowing the words “logic” and not knowing anything about the existence of this science. Consequently, in the mind of these people without their knowledge the logic congenital to them acts. A thousand tribes also speak correctly in their own languages without knowing the rules of grammar; however, these rules, without the speaker’s knowledge, are observed by them. And now there are still hundreds of languages whose grammars have not yet been written. There are already millennia of different arts, although so far none of the philosophers have managed to create a satisfactory art theory, although philosophers still argue even about the very notion of “art”. The same can be said about gnoseology or the theory of cognition. Although philosophers have not yet reached an agreement even on the basic questions of this theory, the very knowledge, undoubtedly, exists and develops in general correctly. Such a discrepancy between practice and the theory of cognition may seem surprising! Is it possible for a person

352 Ibid. – P. 11.

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to act according to the rules without knowing these rules? Is it possible to discover new truths without knowing what the truth is, what is knowledge? Obviously, it is possible if it happens in reality. It is also possible to use a steam engine, steamer, car, telegraph, telephone, electric flashlight without knowing the exact device of these machines, or even the most driving reason. People also use their cognitive activity without knowing its mechanism and device».353

Everything would be fine, but this kind of “common sense” is really a reaction to skepticism that expresses socially constructed paradigm constructs rather than scientific thinking. Meanwhile, there were only a few years left before the understanding of the dependence of the results of knowledge on the language... Separately, it is possible to note that “sanity” of the same A. Korzybski is a concept completely opposite to the “common sense” of the Scottish school.354 Within the framework of general semantics, sanity means a critical attitude to language. In general, it may be noted in this context that the development of the new term the “semantic limits of law”, which may include the notion of common sense, but not necessarily, is a methodologically sound task. The approach we propose on the following pages of the study also resonates with our own interpretation of the absurd in the works of T. Reed, who wrote, in particular, that

«[i]f there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the ‘constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life,’ without being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd».355

By the way, it should be noted in this context that the eight principles of internal morality of law by L. Fuller can also be considered as criteria of non-absurdity, and their

353Ibid. – P. 12–13.

354See: Korzybski A. Science and Sanity. 5th Ed. 2nd Printing. Brooklyn, New York: Institute of General Semantics, 2000. – 825 p.

355Cited by: Thomas Reid Quotes [Electronic resource] // Goodreads. – [Site]. – URL: https://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/17381.Thomas_Reid (accessed: 24.02.2019).